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A Structural Revision of the
Conflicts Restatement
LOUISE WEINBERG*
Ah Love! could thou and I with Fate conspire
To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire,
Would not we shatter it to bits-and then
Re-mould it nearer to the Heart's Desire!'
I. INTRODUCTION
The question for discussion is whether, as we face the new millennium, the
formalisms now widely used by judges in choosing law should be retained. Does the
current Restatement,2 now under wide adoption in both state and federal courts,3 need
rethinking? Should it all be swept away and a fresh start made?
In this Article, in order to follow the format of this Symposium, I set to one side
the doubts I have expressed in recent work about the conflict-of-laws enterprise.4 I
try to identify some of the larger theoretical problems presented by the choice-of-law
provisions of the Second Restatement, and to explain how it can be reconstructed on
improved lines. I argue for major changes in the Restatement's overall workings. I
propose a change in the Restatement's master presumption looking to the law of the
place of "most significant contact," and in its further presumptive territorial choices
of law. I propose changing the relationship between the whole vast work and its very
brief but operative section, section 6. Section 6, of course, is the feature of the Second
Restatement that contains the list ofpolicy factors that the Restatement suggests must
ultimately be taken into account in any choice of law. On the thinking that we need
to take with us into the future something like section 6, I go on to try to show how
section 6 might be retooled to advantage.
If the Restatement were to be reconstructed along the lines I suggest here, and a
third restatement built on the experience of the Second Restatement, the outcome, I
* William B. Bates Chair for the Administration of Justice, The University of Texas. This
Article was prepared for a talk I gave at the Association of American Law School's Annual
Meeting, New Orleans, January 9, 1999, forthe Section on the Conflict of Laws, Gene Shreve,
Chair. All citations to recent cases and writings are as of that date. I am grateful to Gene
Shreve for inviting this work, and to him and my other co-panelists, Fritz Juenger, Bill
Reynolds, and Symeon Symeonides, for valuable insights.
1. EDWARD FITZGERALD, THE RUBAIYAT OF OMAR KHAYYAM, FIRST EDITION
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2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs (1971) [hereinafter SECOND
RESTATEMENT].
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Restatement. See, e.g., American Home Assurance Co. v. L & L Marine Serv., Inc., 153 F.3d
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would hope, would reflect more nearly the acknowledged ideals of conflicts law,
which are very like the ideals of all law in courts. Interestingly, these seemingly
technical questions raise issues generic to all legal theory. Fractal-like,5 even on this
confined scale the underlying issues have to do with justice and principle.
1I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS: THE MISSING PRECONDITION
We should not suppose that a would-be drafter of a new restatement would set
about her task with the same sense of crisis, the same conviction of a need for rescue,
that attended the decision to abandon the First Restatement.6 Even before its 1934
publication, the First Restatement had come under attack. The late Willis Reese, who
was Reporter to the Second Restatement, once said that it had become obvious that
conflict of laws had not been ripe for restatement in the 1930s.' The laconic and
peremptory style ofthe First Restatement's black-letter propositions can be attributed,
perhaps, to the intensity ofdisagreement between members of the advisory group and
the Reporter, Joseph Beale-disagreement over even the explanations for the rules
that Beale offered in his accompanying notes and comments. Even the always
courteous Reese ventured to say that Beale's fixed and universal territorial rules
showed little understanding of "the fluidity and of the complexities and uncertainties
of the subject."9 Indeed, Reese went so far as to charge that "many of the rules stated
in [the first] Restatement [were] wrong or at least so over-simplified as to be
misleading."'
Very little of that sort of indictment can be leveled at the Second Restatement.
Whatever its academic critics may think, the Second Restatement is working about
as well as can be expected. I do not mean to say that the mechanics of the Second
Restatement are working; quite the contrary. But my sense of the situation is that the
very vagueness and open-endedness for which the Second Restatement is criticized"
5. Fractals are jagged curves or surfaces that retain the same index ofjaggedness when
examined at any level of minuteness. Coastlines, for example, are fractal; the big bays and
inlets will have little bays and inlets of the same general pattern. There may actually be some
uses for this information. See BENOITB. MANDELBROT, THE FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF NATURE
(1983).
6. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) (Joseph Beale, Reporter).
In this Article I limit discussion to the Second Restatement's choice-of-law provisions.
7. See Willis L.M. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second. 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 679, 680 (1963).
8. See id. at 679.
9. Id. at 680.
10. Id.
I1. Captured, in effect, by critics of the Second Restatement's open-endedness, the
American Law Institute ("ALl") has only recently emerged from its disastrous struggle over
conflicts recommendations for mass torts, see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX
LITIGATION PROJECT, STATUTORY PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.01 (Proposed
Final Draft Apr. 5, 1993), opting by the closest of votes for "rules" so convoluted and
hazardous that no court has ever so much as mentioned them. (A summer 1998 Westlaw search
for post-1993 federal or state cases mentioning the ALl Complex Litigation Project by title
literally turned up zero.) The "closest of votes" to which I refer here came on my motion to
amend, which would have converted the proposal from a mandatory hierarchy of tests to a rule
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are enabling judges to follow their good sense and intuition to reach reasonably sound
results. So the most we can say is that a third restatement might somewhat improve
the rationality and readability of conflicts decisions. Perhaps that is inducement
enough to try. On the other hand, since the better is so often the enemy of the good,
some risk must attend any such enterprise.
III. MORE PRELIMINARY REMARKS: THE (RUSTY)
MECHANICS OF THE SECOND RESTATEMENT
All that said, if we are going to have a third restatement that truly works, we need
to do something about the mechanics of the Second Restatement.
No one can really want to stick with the way the Second Restatement works.
Treating judges like little children, it forces them to print out, over and over, its sterile
black-letter lists. For virtually every characterized issue there is a master rule that the
law of the place of most significant contact governs that issue. Well, why notjust say
that, trans-substantively? There then follows a dreary list of likely places, "contacts"
ofpossible significance, no doubt intended to drive home the message that there need
be no single territorial choice A la the First Restatement. But why drive this home
again and again and again and again? The kicker is that, even so, the Second
Restatement mostly winds up with a presumption that that very place, the one the
First Restatement would have chosen, "governs" after all. Forget the irony of this;
just think of the waste motion.
But it will be seen at once that the problem of waste motion is more serious than
I have suggested. What if a case presents only a false conflict? Under the Second
Restatementwe are seeingjudges wearing themselves out solving false conflicts. This
is chronic. I am looking at a 1997 Vermont case, Miller v. White." In Miller, the
choice was between giving the plaintiff access to a full remedy at the forum, which
also was the joint domicile of the parties, or remitting the plaintiff to a limited
of alternative reference. This motion followed even more drastic but unsuccessful motions by
Professors Juenger and Trautman. See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
70TH ANNUAL MEETING 255-80 (1993).
For critical analyses of the ALI's work, see Fred I. Williams, The Complex Litigation
Project's Choice of Law Rules for Mass Torts and How To Escape Them, 1995 BYU L. REV.
1081 (criticizing the proposal); Friedrich K. Juenger, The Complex Litigation Project's Tort
Choice-of-Law Rules, 54 LA. L. REV. 907 (1994) (same); Symeon C. Symeonides, The ALI's
Complex Litigation Project: Commencing the National Debate, 54 LA. L. REV. 843 (1994)
(supporting the effort); Donald T. Trautman, Some Thoughts on Choice of Law, Judicial
Discretion, and the ALIs Complex Litigation Project, 54 LA. L. REV. 835 (1994) (criticizing
the proposal); Louise Weinberg, Mass Torts at the Neutral Forum: A Critical Analysis of the
American Law Institute's Proposed Choice Rule, 56 ALB. L. REV. 807 (1993) (same)
[hereinafter Weinberg, Mass Torts].
For further discussion, see Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 547 (1996); Linda S. Mullenix, UnfinishedSymphony: The ComplexLitigation Project
Rests, 54 LA. L. REv. 977 (1994); James A.R. Nafziger, Choice ofLaw in Air Disaster Cases:
Complex Litigation Rules and the Common Law, 54 LA. L. REV. 1001 (1994); Gene R. Shreve,
Reform Aspirations of the Complex Litigation Project, 54 LA. L. REv. 1139 (1994).
12. 702 A.2d 392 (Vt. 1997).
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administrative remedy at the place of injury, Quebec. 3 Of course the Vermont court
very rightly opened its doors.' 4 But why did the court have to go through a tiresome
analysis under the Second Restatement to solve a problem that the veriest rookie
could have seen did not exist? 5
Such experiences suggest that a third restatement should find a way to avoid
entangling courts in lengthy formulaic incantations in advance of determining the
relevant interests of the concerned states in a particular issue on the facts of a
particular case. That is especially so when one considers the risk in cases like Miller.
What if, in the occasionally insensitive court,'6 the parties in a false conflict case wind
up with the law of the uninterested state?
On a more theoretical level, it will also be appreciated that courts using the Second
Restatement's ungainly and doubtful apparatus are chronically falling into the-
premodern trap of choosing governance in a vacuum. This is most likely to happen
in courts failing to reach the policy prompts of section 6. Yet choosing a sovereign
to "govern" in the abstract is antithetical to much of what we have learned about the
conflict of laws in the second half of this century. We now know that the task is to
choose law, not places. "Jurisdiction-selecting" rules, 7 like the presumptive territorial
rules of the Second Restatement, never have been in tune with modem conflicts
thinking.'" Such methods are widely criticized as too abstract to reflect what is at
13. See id. at 397.
14. See id.
15. 1 have been asked to explain for the sake of the generalist reader why Miller was a false
conflict. A "false conflict," classically, is a case in which there is only one state with any
governmental interest in the issue before the court. Thus, a false conflict presents no problem
in choosing law. The law that governs is the law of the only interested state. Miller was just
such a case. The only interests of a place of injury, with no other contact with a case, are
diffuse general interests in deterring any such future occurrences there, and in making whole
anyone injured on its territory. So a place of injury, without more, can have no interest in
impeding adjudication. Since, as the joint domicile, the forum in Miller did have an interest
in adjudicating the dispute between the parties, and a further interest in seeing its resident made
whole, the case was a classic false conflict: The forum was the only "interested" state.
16. We tend to forget that cases are arguedto judges. By lawyers. There is plenty of blame
to go around: The bar examiners should not have cut conflicts from the exam; law students
should start taking the course again anyway; professors should give those who do take it the
formative study in jurisprudence the course, at its best, has always been.
17. The term was the late Professor Cavers's. See DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW
PROCESS passim (1965) [hereinafter CAVERs, THE CHOICE-oF-LAW PROCESS]. See also his
seminal article, David F. Cavers, A Critique ofthe Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV.
173, 194 (1933).
18. Caveat: There is no viable alternative method, as yet, to resolve federal-state conflicts.
Federal-state ("vertical") conflicts still are resolved by first identifying the sovereign that is
to "govern." If state law governs, as we say, "of its own force," it does so under Erie v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Then, under Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313
U.S. 487 (1941), federal courts, like state courts, proceed to identify under the forum state's
conflicts rules which state's law "governs," and only then to construe that state's law. E.g.,
Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial
Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1459 (1997). If, on the other hand, federal law
"governs," it does so under the Supremacy Clause. But, federal power having been
acknowledged, courts then go on to a further stage of analysis, considering whether to pick up
[Vol. 75:475
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stake.'9 But those of us who feel that, for whatever reason, the Second Restatement
is working reasonably well, go on pushing these dissonances from our minds, even
as they go on irritating and disturbing us.
Judges using the Second Restatement do seem to reach decent results in fact. They
would do this in any" event. Very probably Restatement simply gives them some
needed cover for what they have to do. But we, and they, should not be fooled into
thinking that they are guided by the Second Restatement, when obviously they are
falling back on their own common sense and intuition.
IV. THE HEART OF THE MATTER: A DISFIGURING RULE
It may come as a shock to some to be asked to consider whether the Second
Restatement's master rule, in favor of the law of the place of "most significant
contact," is not only unwieldy, as I have already suggested, and not only vague and
open-ended, the charge under which it has always labored, but actually wrong.
The Second Restatement takes the usual real-world presumption that a court is
likely to apply its own law, and simply trashes it, leaving everybody wandering about
in the wreckage trying to figure out where to go.2" Courts are told to go to the "place
whatever the state rule happens to be anyway. Even at this second stage, no true construction
of state law takes place. The reason for the existence of the second stage is that there is no
federal law on point: if there were, it would apply. In the absence of governing federal law, the
court weighs the undesirability of fashioning new federal common law against the utility of
general state governance on the particular issue. See, e.g., DeSylvav. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570,
580-82 (1956) (Harlan, J.) (using state law to determine who is a "child" for purposes of
federal copyright renewal, in order to avoid fashioning a federal rule that would disturb settled
expectations under state intestacy and family laws). On this class of problems see Louise
Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: "Actual" Conflicts, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1743
(1992) [hereinafter Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict], and Louise Weinberg, Federal
CommonLaw, 83 Nw. U.L.REV. 805,837-38 (1989) [hereinafter Weinberg, FederalCommon
Law]. For recent work on related material, see, for example, Paul Lund, The Decline ofFederal
Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REv. 895 (1996), and Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A
Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245 (1996).
19. Under the Second Restatement, of course, courts choose law by choosing places every
day, providing us with some bizarre reading. See, e.g., Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 703 A.2d 1132, 1138-52 (Conn. 1997). There, the Connecticut court,
by its chiefjustice, purported to perform an interest analysis under section 6, but failed in fact
to do so, or in any way to articulate its dilemma in an unprovided-for case. The court wound
up with the presumptive choice suggested by section 193 for insurance cases-the place of the
insured risk. That "place" was not only almost surreally irrelevant to the issue of notice of
claim, but also was ten different places--contamination sites. Moreover, the court actually
knew the content of the notice-of-claim rule at only one of these states, Washington (the law
of which, unlike New York's, was plaintiff-favoring). Id.
20. Caveat: Inthefederal-state ("vertical") conflict of laws, the presumption that the forum
will apply its own law (i.e., that federal courts will apply federal law and state courts state law)
is wrong and would be unconstitutional if tried. Under Erie, state law applies, when it applies,
in both sets of courts; under the Supremacy Clause, federal law applies, when it applies, in both
sets of courts. Thus, in our system, although interstate forum shopping for better law goes on
and is tolerated, federal-state forum shopping for better law is, in theory, futile. The position
is spelled out in LOUISE WEINBERG, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND COMMENTS ON JUDICIAL
2000]
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of most significant contact," but where is that place? The Second Restatement does
offer the lost soul a compass, but the compass needle is stuck, and is stuck in the
wrong place. As we all know, nine times out often it gets you to the territory where
some underlying event occurred, the very place the First Restatement would have
chosen. This, although the author of the Second Restatement himself, as we have
seen, had boldly criticized the territorial choices of the First Restatement as simply
"wrong."' This, although eight years into the Second Restatement project, Brainerd
Currie had demonstrated that the territory where an event occurs may have little or
no interest in governing a conflicts case.' And now the empiricists are telling us that
these territorial presumptions are so wrongheaded that courts are simply paying no
attention to them.23 Ladies and gentlemen, surely we can do better than this.
What are territorial presumptions, after all-what is the "place of most significant
contact," after all-but a presumption that the forum will not apply its own law? Such
twisted thinking can be seen in one of its more acute manifestations in the Supreme
Court's current federal commonlaw rule that acts of Congress are presumed to have
no extraterritorial application.24 Notwithstanding the good intentions of lawyers and
judges who think such a rule a wise one, in cases in which the disputed conduct
clearly falls within the scope of the legislation such a presumption is likely to lead to
arbitrary and discriminatory results. Take the Supreme Court's 1991 Aramco case.
There the Court, setting up this unconsidered presumption against extraterritorial
application of forum law, construed Title VII to be without effect abroad.2" But to a
FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL POWER 15 (1994) [hereinafter WEINBERG, FEDERAL COURTS];
Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict, supra note 18, at 1754-55; Louise Weinberg, The Place
of Trial and the Law Applied: Overhauling Constitutional Theory, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 67-
69 (1988) [hereinafter Weinberg, Place of Trial]. On the general duty of state courts to hear
federal cases, see, for example, Michael G. Collins, Article 111 Cases, State Court Duties, and
the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 39; Louise Weinberg, The Power ofCongress
over Courts in Nonfederal Cases, 1995 BYU L. REV. 731.
21. See supra text accompanying note 10.
22. See Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method,
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 242-44 (1958) (setting out tables to demonstrate that, among contact
states, the place of transaction or occurrence is likely to matter least to the resolution of a
conflict of laws); see, e.g., Gordon v. Kramer, 604 P.2d 1153, 1158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979)
(holding the trial court in error for applying the law of the uninterested place of injury).
Caveat: The places of the parties' transaction or occurrence do have certain general or residual
interests which may emerge in a given case. See generally DAVID H. VERNON ET AL.,
CONFLICTOF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 299-309 (1990) (correcting the Currie
charts); Weinberg, Mass Torts, supra note 11, at 846-52 (making the point); Louise Weinberg,
On Departing from Forum Law, 35 MERCER L. REV. 595, 618-26 (1983-84) (same)
[hereinafter Weinberg, On Departing from Forum Law].
23. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Prologomenon to an Empirical
Restatement of Conflicts, 75 IND. L.J. 417 (2000).
24. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244,248 (1991) (holding,
based on a presumption against extraterritoriality, that Title VII did not cover Americans
working abroad for American companies) (citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,
285 (1949)).
25. Id.; see Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 US.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
This is the basic federal law against discrimination in employment.
[Vol. 75:475
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Congress trying to regulate the discriminatory conduct of American employers on
behalf of American workers, what difference can the location of the discrimination
make? To be sure, in a given transnational case, considerations of foreign policy
might, to some minds, trump even civil rights. But those considerations are not
generally a feature in the interstate cases the Second Restatement addresses. Aramco,
of course, had the consequence of exposing American employees working abroad for
American companies to racial and other obnoxious prejudices, and to the sometimes
medieval or barbaric preferences or practices of the host countries. Think especially
of what, in Islamic countries-as in Aramco--would be the situation of American
Jewish employees, or American women employees, once stripped of the protections
of American law in American courts. The American employer with impunity could
either submit them to Saudi ideas, or simply stop offering them the opportunity of the
foreign assignment. Aramco was so clearly wrong26 that Congress stepped in and
amended Title VII to require its extraterritorial application in future, at least in cases
in which discriminatory or degrading employment practices are not actually
mandatory under the laws of the host country.27
Willis Reese, to his credit, did see that in real life the forum presumes its own law
applies, and applies in fact to matters a proper construction brings within their scope.
As he put this:
If the purposes sought to be achieved by a local statute or common-law rule would
be furthered by its application to an out-of-state occurrence, this is a weighty
reason why such application should be made. It is only to be expected that a court
will favor its own local policies over those of other states.28
Here Reese was perceiving, I think, the duty of a court to give effect to the positive
commands of its own sovereign. The 1984 Laker case in the D.C. Circuit29 surely
must be one of the more dramatic examples of this perceived judicial duty to enforce
forum law. In Laker, another transnational case, you will recall that Judge Wilkey of
the District of Columbia Circuit applied the Sherman Act to the conduct of the
foreign conspirators who had driven Freddie Laker's transatlantic air carrier out of
service. Judge Wilkey rejected the multi-pronged, "balancing" analyses
recommended in famous transnational cases in other circuits," adopted by the
revisers of the Foreign Relations Restatement.3' Those other courts, aiming for an
26. My reactions to Aramco when it was handed down are in Louise Weinberg, Against
Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 73-76 (1991-92) [hereinafter Weinberg, Against Comity].
27. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). The struggle to enact this
legislation is recounted in WEINBERG, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 20, at 353-58.
28. Reese, supra note 7, at 683.
29. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
30. Id. at 948-52. See the influential Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d
1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that courts considering applying American law in cases
with foreign elements should perform a balancing of factors); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614-15 (9th Cir. 1976) (semble).
31. See the then-pending RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THEUNrrED STATES § 403 (Tentative DraftNo. 2, 198 1). For an account ofthe debate between
Judge Wilkey, a member of the ALI advisory group on this revision of the Foreign Relations
Restatement, and its Reporter, see Harold G. Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts, or
2000]
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appearance of comity, were seeking, in effect, to discover the place of most
significant contact with an international tort. Well, Judge Wilkey seemed to be saying,
that is all very well, ladies and gentlemen. But I have an act of Congress on my
hands.a2 And one has to agree with him, that a straightforward construction of the
Sherman Act would put the Laker conspirators squarely within the act's scope. In
particular, Judge Wilkey rejected that there could be any overriding consideration of
comity: "Despite the real obligation of courts to apply international law and foster
comity, domestic courts do not sit as internationally constituted tribunals. Domestic
courts are created by national constitutions and statutes to enforce primarily national
laws."33
Laker remains controversial,34 but the Supreme Court seems to be returning to the
classic modernist position that the applicability of forum law is a question of
construction and interpretation of the law of the forum. The Court also has clarified
that it shares Judge Wilkey's view at least in antitrust cases; it holds antitrust cases
to be an exception to its general presumption against extraterritoriality.35 More
"There and Back Again", 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 7,36-40 (1984).
32. See Laker, 731 F.2d at 945-46 (Wilkey, J.).
Legitimate United States interests in protecting consumers, providing for
vindicating creditors' rights, and regulating economic consequences of those
doing substantial business in our country are all advanced under the
congressionally prescribed scheme.... Congress has been aware of the decades-
long controversy accompanying the recurrent assertion of [Sherman Act]
jurisdiction over foreign anticompetitive acts [with] effects in the United States
dating back nearly forty years but has ... not yet chosen to limit the laws'
application.
Id. (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 951.
34. For criticism of Laker, see, for example, Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in anAge
of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 Sup. CT. REv. 289, 318. But see William S.
Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial
Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L L. J. 101, 150-51 (1998) ("1 agree with Currie and Wilkey that
courts are the wrong institution to reconcile differences between U.S. and foreign regulatory
policy.... [C]ourts are not the best institutions to resolve regulatory conflicts."); James M.
Grippando, Declining to Exercise Extraterritorial Antitrust Jurisdiction on the Grounds of
International Comity: An Illegitimate Extension of the Judicial Abstention Doctrine, 23 VA.
J. INT'L L. 395 (1983). For a recent considered discussion, see John H. Chung, The
International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 and the Maelstrom Surrounding
the Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Act, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 371, 399-400 (1996).
35. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993) (holding by Justice
Souter, for a divided Court, that the district court should have enforced the Sherman Act
against foreign conspirators notwithstanding principles of comity); id. at 814 (Scalia, J.,
writing for the Court in part, dissenting in part) (explaining that the Sherman Act is an
exception to the general presumption against extraterritorial application of acts of Congress)
(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 n.6 (1986));
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,444 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.)); see
also Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280,288 (1952); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,
274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNTED STATES § 415, and Reporters' Note 3 (1987).
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importantly, in the 1993 Hartford Fire case,36 Justice Souter, in his opinion for the
Court, made no reference to a presumption against extraterritoriality, and simply
performed the lawyerly job of interpreting and construing federal law on the facts
before him."
You can see the desuetude of comity-driven ideas in a recent transnational
bankruptcy opinion in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The
Ninth Circuit, of course, is the very court that has given us perhaps the leading case
on comity in this country;38 but here it simply cited and expanded on Laker, going so
far as to conclude that "the presumption against extraterritoriality is not applicable
when the regulated conduct is 'intended to, and results in, substantial effects within
the United States."' 39
So how did the concerns of the forum state, acknowledged from the beginning by
Willis Reese, come to be displaced by those of other, "significant contact" states,
when the Second Restatement was taking final shape?
V. THE FORUM AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Judge Wilkey's insight, that it is the forum's duty to apply its own law-if
warranted by reasonable construction-is always hard for observers to accept.40 It
sounds so provincial, so biased, so wanting in a due comity. And views favoring
comity in choice of law are deeply held, held perhaps by most of us. Comity seems
to be as hard to clear away as lex loci. We can see that, pulling against the vehemence
of such views, Willis Reese barely managed to keep the interests of the forum alive
in the Second Restatement. He managed to retain a reference to forum interests, but
only in section 6's list of overall policy considerations.4 ' He could not keep the
forum's interests in the foreground of the Second Restatement.
Meanwhile, what had appeared in Reese's writing as only one among several
"policies" a court ought to take into account, a policy that "[t]he court should seek to
36. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799.
.37. See id.
38. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597,614-15 (9th Cir. 1976).
39. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon, 153 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Laker, 731 F.2d at 925).
40. For the view that there is no necessary presumption in favor of forum law, see Larry
Kramer, InterestAnalysisandthe Presumption ofForum Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1301 (1989).
But see, e.g., Hurtado v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 666,670 (Cal. 1974) ("[G]enerally speaking
the forum will apply its own [law] unless a party litigant timely invokes the law of a foreign
state."). Professor Kramer argues that the presumption of sufficiency of a complaint does the
necessary work of the presumption in favor of forum law. He apparently would place no tie-
breaking value on the commands of the local legislature in cases of true conflict. Professor
Kramer's other work has attempted in other ways to create a theory of comity-inspired
departure from forum law; my views on these attempts are in Weinberg, Against Comity, supra
note 26. For additional recent writing on forum-law approaches to choice of law, see, for
example, John T. Cross, A Defense of Kentucky's Approach to Choice of Law, 25 N. KY. L.
REV. 553 (1998); Stanley E. Cox, Razing Conflicts Facades To Build Better Jurisdiction
Theory: The Foundation-There Is No Law but Forum Law, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1993-94).
41. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 6(2)(b).
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apply the law of the state of dominant interest,"42 became transformed into the broad,
initial, core presumption of most of the Second Restatement: the law of the place of
"most significant contact." The familiar story is that Professor Reese and Judge Fuld,
of the New York Court of Appeals, built on each other's thinking to develop the new
concept, peculiar to their period, of what the English would call the "proper law" of
a tort or contract-the "center of gravity" of, or "place of most significant contact"
with, a transaction.43
Further to downplay the concerns of the forum state, Reese idealistically accepted
the lofty view that law should be chosen with disinterestedness if not downright
altruism. He came to endorse a phenomenon that has virtually zero existence in real
life, as Reese himself acknowledged:" a "neutral" forum.45 You may well wonder
how the typical forum state in this country can be considered neutral and still
overwhelmingly be the place where the plaintiff resides. For that matter, how can the
typical forum state in this country be considered neutral and still be a place with
power over a defendant which has purposefully availed itself of the benefits and
burdens of forum law? Yet the Second Restatement perversely assumes a noble
disinterestedness at the forum, as if the parties were adjudicating their squabble on
Mars.
42. Reese, supra note 7, at 688 (emphasis omitted).
43. Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954) (Fuld, J.) (choosing the unidentified law
of England to govern a support agreement where New York law might have terminated the
obligation). Of course the choice-of-law "revolution" was more complicated than this. The
seminal works of Walter Wheeler Cook, David Cavers, and, in the late '50s, Brainerd Currie,
must be taken into account. Then there are the great interest-analytic Supreme Court cases of
the '30s, '50s, and '60s. For a theoretical synthesis of the constitutional cases, see Louise
Weinberg, Choice ofLaw and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1982), reprinted in
part in GENE R. SHREVE, A CONFLICT-OF-LAWS ANTHOLOGY 339 (1997). Certainly the work
of other state courts, notably California, needs to be factored in. For a recent glimpse of
another judicial chapter in a complex story, see Geri Yonover, The Golden Anniversary of the
Choice of Law Revolution: Indiana Fired the First Shot, 29 IND. L. REV. 1201 (1996).
Among the tentative drafts of the Second Restatement, the earliest resort to the place of
"most significant relationship" occurs, as far as I can tell, in 1959, in the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332(b) (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1959) (on "Contracts"). In
1959 the validity of a contract was presumptively governed by the law of place of making if
it was also the place of performance. See id. § 332b(a). If not, then it was governed by the
place of "most significant relationship." Id. § 332n(b). Auten v. Auten is cited in the Reporter's
notes, but as only one among other cases. Id. at 36. The "place of most significant relationship"
formula then shows up in RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONFLICTOF LAWS § 379(1) (Tentative
Draft No. 8, 1963) (on "Wrongs"). The rule is in substantially the same form today.
44. See Reese, supra note 7, at 692-93 ("It can, of course, be said in criticism that cases
rarely arise in truly neutral forums.... Yet... even an interested forum will usually be guided
by what it conceives to be correct rules of choice of law.").
45. Id. at 692 ("The Restatement is written from the viewpoint of a neutral forum which
has no interest of its own to protect and is seeking only to apply the most appropriate law.")
The fantasy of a neutral forum in interest analysis is implicit in both Cavers, works cited supra
note 17, and William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1,
19-21 (1963).
[Vol. 75:475
A STRUCTURAL REVISION
The consequence is that the Second Restatement fails to give the interests of the
forum state their actual weight. Rather, the Second Restatement substitutes a
presumption of foreign governance quite antithetical to common usage and
disrespectful of the positive commands of a sovereign in its own courts. These
sovereign commands it demotes to section 6, where spuriously equivalent value is
assigned to the interests of other states and to the needs of the interstate and
international systems.
So it is among the least of the ills associated with the Second Restatement's
presumptive subordination of the law of the forum to the law of some more
"significant" contact state, that it sends judges off on wild goose chases. It is among
the least of these ills even that, deflected from section 6's salubrious list of real
choice-of-law policies, forced to find the place "of most significant contact," judges
must trudge through pages of rigmarole before they can begin to apply the law of
some interested state. It is only a little more troubling that, in cases of false conflict,
those judges who understandably fail to reach the comparatively safe ground of
section 6 run the risk of also failing to see what it is that they have on their hands, and
so of choosing the law of the uninterested state.
But it is profoundly wrong and very dangerous for a court to ignore the commands
of its own legislature, on matters within its constitutional competence.4 6 When the
Second Restatement devalues the interests of the forum it devalues the interests of
justice. Injured plaintiffs, often lacking deep pockets, tend to sue at home-in other
words, in states "interested" in enforcing their ordinary tort law to compensate those
plaintiffs; and such resident plaintiffs cannot be turned away as "forum shoppers."
Yet the Second Restatement disregards their legitimate claims under home law. To
the extent that even nonresident plaintiffs can be considered private attorneys general
enforcing legal norms, comity-inspired departures from forum law can, if widespread,
create a problem of global nonenforcement of shared legal norms, and, ultimately,
global lawlessness.47
If these reflections have any merit, the Second Restatement's formula, the "law of
the place of most significant contact," and its further presumptive territorial choices,
have been very wrong turns indeed.
I will return to the subject of the forum and its discontents very shortly, in
discussion of section 6, with which the rest of this paper is concerned.
46. For the argument that judges in an "interested" state cannot disregard its law without
grave dysfunction, see generally Weinberg, Against Comity, supra note 26; Weinberg, Place
of Trial, supra note 20, at 84; Weinberg, On Departingfrom Forum Law, supra note 22. Such
dysfunction includes discrimination between similarly situated residents in different cases; the
undermining of local policy; enforcement of explicitly disfavored law; subversion of the rule
of law; and, when widespread under spurious theories of comity and reciprocity, global denials
of access to justice, with concomitant global lawlessness.
47. This is a main argument of Weinberg, Against Comity, supra note 26. For recent related
argumentation, see Dodge, supra note 34. But see Scott Fruehwald, A Multilateralist Method
of Choice ofLaw, 85 KY. L.J. 347 (1996-97). For interesting commentary see Jeffrey Brand-
Ballard, Legitimacy Consequentialism, and Conflict ofLaws: Lea Brilmeyer 's Rights-Based
Theory, 30 NEW ENG. L. REv. 39 (1995).
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VI. THE BIRTH OF SECTION 6
Let us acknowledge, at the outset, that section 6 has been the saving of the Second
Restatement. After the characteristic waste motion of spelling out the substantive
sections and subsections, judges turn with obvious relief to the operative feature of
the Second Restatement, section 6. This list of general choice-of-law considerations
is what gives judges access to modem analysis. Judges can consider the policies and
interests of the forum and of other concerned states.4' Their way is cleared at least to
identify and eliminate false conflicts.
Where does this saving feature come from? Section 6 is often traced to a 1952
article by Elliott Cheatham and Willis Reese, discussing enumerated"major policies"
of choice of law.49 Reese had become Reporter of the proposed new Second
Restatement in 1951. But, oddly, section 6 does not emerge in the Restatement in
anything like its current form until some fifteen years after the Cheatham and Reese
essay. Section 6 as we know it appears out of the blue in the penultimate 1967 draft. 0
Nothing like section 6 is in any earlier draft.
The successive drafts of the Second Restatement, over the course of twenty years
from 1951 to 197 1, were not, typically, rewrites. Rather, new drafts usually covered
previously unaddressed substantive areas of law. Reese typically took counsel from
leading scholars in the various substantive fields. In 1965, as he approached the end
of this enormous labor, Willis Reese returned to the beginning of the Second
Restatement, with anew general introduction. This introduction covered "The Reason
for Rules of Conflict of Laws; Its Subject Matter and Meaning" and also "Basic
Principles."'" The Director of the Institute, Herbert Wechsler, provided a Foreword
to this, explaining: "When the Conflict of Laws Restatement, Second, was begun, it
was wisely thought that the revision of the introductory chapter should be postponed
until the body of the work had been completely re-examined. This draft signals the
48. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 6, "Choice-of-Law Principles," provides in
pertinent part: "[T]he factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include... (b)
the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue .... "
49. Elliott E. Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM.
L. REV. 959 (1952). The list appears as section headings: "I. The Needs of the Interstate and
International Systems," id. at 962, "II. A Court Should Apply Its Own Local Law Unless There
Is Good Reason For Not Doing So," id. at 964, "III. A Court Should Seek to Effectuate the
Purpose of Its Relevant Local Law Rule in Determining a Question of Choice of Law," id at
965, "IV. Certainty, Predictability, Uniformity of Result," id. at 969, "V. Protection of Justified
Expectations," id. at 970, "VI. Application of the Law of the State of Dominant Interest," id.
at 972, "VII. Ease in Determination of Applicable Law, Convenience of the Court," id. at 976,
"VIII. The Fundamental Policy Underlying the Broad Local Law Field Involved," id. at 978,
"IX. Justice in the Individual Case," id. at 980.
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (Proposed Official Draft
1967). Although the Second Restatement reached publication in 1971, the final approved and
"promulgated" draft appeared two years earlier in 1969, and was concerned with matters not
having to do with section 6.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS i, 1, 16 (Tentative Draft No. 12,
1965).
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arrival of that stage ... ."52 Yet all section 6 amounted to at that time was this: "In
formulating rules of Conflict of Laws, a state will give consideration to the interests
of other states as well as to its own interests."53 In the comments accompanying this
laconic bromide, Reese said nothing about the Cheatham and Reese "policies." He
spoke briefly of a need for consideration of sister-state interests, but, interestingly,
warned against the notion of tit-for-tat reciprocity. 4 "In formulating common law
rules of conflict of laws," he explained, "the courts are rarely guided by
considerations of reciprocity. Private parties, it is felt, should not be made to suffer
for the fact that the courts of the state from which they come give insufficient
consideration to the interests of the state of the forum."5 5
We do not know why, suddenly, in 1966, in discussion among Reese's advisers of
the forthcoming 1967 draf Roger Traynor, Chief Judge of the California Supreme
Court, a member of the advisory group, made a strong pitch for inclusion of
something like the section 6 we have today. We do know that at the 1967 meeting of
the Institute, something resembling the 1952 Cheatham and Reese "policies" first
made its way into the "black letter" of the SecondRestatement. Introducing this 1967
reformulation, Reese somewhat misleadingly suggested more of a preexistence for
section 6 than, strictly speaking, can be traced:
The first change that I would like to draw your attention to in the draft, if I can go
to Section 6, on Page 12, is Choice of Law Principles. I think the matter contained
in this section was mentioned considerably more briefly in the comments to one
of the sections in the introductory chapter that was before you two years ago.
[561
However, the Advisers, and particularly ChiefJustice Traynor, felt that this matter
was of some importance, and that it should be put in black letter form.57
At this point, a vigorous, prolonged, but unrelated interruption by a person from
Porlock, as it were,5" in the form of the late Myres McDougal,59 deflected the
attention of the members. No discussion of section 6 took place at that meeting or
indeed, at any meeting. Remarkably, regrettably, section 6 was never the subject of
floor debate.
52. Id. at vii.
53. Id. at 16.
54. See id. at 16-17.
55. Id., § 6 cmt. b, at 16.
56. I cannot find what Reese is referring to here.
57. AAMERICANLAWINSTITUrE,PROCEEDINGSOFTHE 44THANNUAL MEETING 395 (1967).
58. The "person from Porlock," of course, is the universally regretted interloper who
knocked on Samuel Taylor Coleridge's door, interrupting him in the throes of composing his
wildly romantic but fragmentary poem, "Kubla Khan." The poem had been inspired by an
opium dream. See Coleridge's own 1798 account, written at the suggestion of Lord Byron, in
THE POETICAL WORKS OF SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE 295 (Ernest Hartley Coleridge ed.
1912), reprinted in 2 THENORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 353 (M. H. Abrams
et al. eds., 5th ed. 1986).
59. McDougal was worried about a want of coordination between the Second Restatement
and the Foreign Relations Restatement.
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VII. CUTTING TO SECTION SIX
The biggest problem we have had with section 6 is that too many judges never
actually get to it. Our enormous Restatement interposes between a problem and the
tools for solving it the clumsy and misleading apparatus I have already described.'
For reasons that will appear, I am particularly interested in the example of the
recent Sixth Circuit case of Cole v. Mileti.6" Cole raised a question of the statute of
limitations. It was an action in Ohio by the resident widow of an investor in a
California movie. The widow alleged that the California producer had failed to repay
her husband's loan. A choice-of-law clause in the parties' Ohio agreement stipulated
for California law. The action was time-barred in California; Ohio, on the other hand,
had a fifteen-year limitations period for cases of this kind. The Court of Appeals,
affmning the judgment of the District Court,62 held for the widow.' There was a
sharp dissent pointing out that the defendant may have lacked even minimum
contacts with Ohio;' but, again, I do not quarrel with the result; only the method.
Cole is among the frequent cases that apply the Restatement's"s revised section
covering the limitation of actions, section 142,' to permit actions under the forum's
longer statute.6' I mention this phenomenon because we are finding that in these
cases, some courts, the Cole court among them, are applying section 142 without
following section 142's clear directive to consult section 6. Indeed, the Cole court did
not even read the black-letter qualifications contained in section 142 itself.
6
60. See supra text accompanying notes 12-39.
61. 133 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 1998).
62. See id. at 437-38. There is no reported opinion-below.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 438.
65. The federal court here was sitting as an Ohio court, Ohio having adopted the Second
Restatement in 1984. See Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 474 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio 1984).
66. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 142 (as amended May 19, 1988):
Whether a claim will be maintained against the defense of the statute of
limitations is determined under the principles stated in § 6. In general, unless the
exceptional circumstances of the case make such a result unreasonable:
(1) The forum will apply its own statute of limitations barring the claim.
(2) The forum will apply its own statute of limitations permitting the claim unless:
(a) maintenance of the claim would serve no substantial interest of the forum; and
(b) the claim would be barred under the statute of limitations of a state having amore
significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence.
67. In the debate over the revision of section 142, I offered an amendment from the floor
which carried. This amendment is codified at section 142(2). Id. It enables the forum, in a
proper case, to apply its own longer statute. (Professor Reese originally had created a loophole
for the longer statute of a sister state, but none for the longer statute of the forum.) See
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 65TH ANNUAL MEETING 329-37 (1988).
68. The Cole courfconsidered section 142(2), but omitted subsections 142(2)(a) and (b).
The court held itself authorized by Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988)
(holding, under the Due Process Clause, that a state is free to apply its own statute of
limitations, even if the result is to reopen a case dead in all other interested states, if the
forum's reason for doing so is adherence to the traditional rule that limitation of actions is a
procedural matter and therefore one for the forum to govern). Cole, 133 F.3d at 436-37. For
discussion of Wortman, see Louise Weinberg, Choosing Law: The Limitations Debates, 1991
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These limitations cases are particularly unfortunate examples of deflection from
section 6, because Willis Reese, late in his life, made a special effort to get courts to
look at section 6, at least on the limitations issue. Early in the 1980s, Reese offered
to remodel a few sections of the Second Restatement, finally limiting himself to the
issue of limitation of actions. With this late endeavor, it became obvious that all
Reese had come to care about, certainly in that context, was section 6. To be sure, in
his revision of the limitations section, section 142, he made a show of conforming to
the mechanics already laid out in the SecondRestatement. The user was expected to
resort, initially, to section 142, not to section 6. Section 142 provides particularized
black-letter rules for choosing law on the limitation of actions, rules of the familiar
kind. But what should interest us is what happened in this revision of section 142 to
Restatement's standard reference to the "place of most significant contact." Reese,
now older and wiser, quietly dropped the "place of most significant contact,"69 and
instead moved the user at once, directly and without further hindrance, to section 6.
This is very like the structural revision I have in mind.
I do not want to overstate Reese's decision to jettison the "place of most significant
contact" here. Reese had a special reason for doing so. Courts had been choosing
limitations law by first choosing law for the underlying claim, on the ineradicable
belief of theorists of the previous generation that limitations law was inherently and
always "substantive."7 Reese was quite rightly trying to disentangle the two issues, 71
and to restore to the field the more lawyerly separation of issues characteristic of the
Second Restatement.
But beyond this more modest aim, Reese did plan from the beginning to assimilate
choice-of-limitations law to choice of lav generally. As he put this in 1986: "Now,
U. ILL. L. REv. 683, 694-705 (1991) [hereinafter Weinberg, Choosing Law].
69. The revised section 142 treats "significant contact" residually only, by suggesting that
the forum ordinarily apply its own longer statute unless it lacks a "substantial interest" in
hearing the case and there is another state with "a more significant relationship to the parties
and the occurrence" that would bar the claim. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 142(2)(a)-(b), supra
note 2 (as amended May 19, 1988). For discussion of technical difficulties with Reese's
revision of section 142, see Weinberg, Choosing Law, supra note 68, at 705-10. For recent
discussion, see New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gourdeau, 647 N.E.2d 42 (Mass. 1995)
(opting for functional desiderata in choosing limitations law, rather than for an automatic
choice of forum law for matters "procedural").
70. See, e.g., UNIF. CONFLICT OF LAWS LIMITATIONS ACT, 12 U.L.A. §§ 60-61 (Supp.
1991). Our English cousins, falling into the trap, have adopted an outmoded "substantive"
approach as well. See Foreign Limitation Periods Act, 1984, ch. 16, § l(1) (Eng.). The
"substantive" approach also temporarily reared its head in a tentative draft on choice of law by
the Reporters of the recent ALl Project on Complex Litigation. See AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT § 6.5, ch. 6 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 1990) (on
"Statutes of Limitation's'). In Wortman, Counsel for Sun Oil argued to an incredulous Supreme
Court that the "substantive" approach was a requirement of due process-that the Constitution
requires courts to choose the limitations law of the "claim state." See Weinberg, Choosing
Law, supra note 68, at 701-05.
71. For an earlier rejection of the "substantive" approach to choosing limitations law, see,
for example, Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that
Washington State would choose limitations law directly and analytically; rejecting the view
that the law governing liability must also govern the issue of limitations).
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what we're suggesting here is to say that the issue of statute of limitations should be
determinedjust the same way as any other issue of choice of law."'72 Reese's revision
of section 142 could help courts choose limitations law rationally. By moving the
user at once to section 6, Reese lay on the table, for immediate consideration, the
functional desiderata enumerated there. Courts choosing limitations law this way
could proceed straightforwardly to the essential task of exploring the interests of the
forum and of the other concerned states.
Now this is the very sort of transformation I am urging here. We could have a new
third restatement that would simply stick to the actual job of choosing law. Our new
restatement, building on Willis Reese's 1988 model, could provide a realistic
presumption in favor of forum law. For the job of considering whether the
presumption is overcome, our new restatement could offer a useful formalism for
courts, since they seem to want one, in an improved section 6 laundry list of
functional desiderata, to which courts would be allowed unimpeded access.
If such a change were to encourage interest analysis,73 the third restatement would
become more faithful, rather than less, to the original thinking behind the Second
Restatement. It should give us pause in designing a third restatement that, for Elliott
Cheatham and Willis Reese, writing in 1952, "[a]pplication of the Law of the State
of Dominant Interest," that is, of "most significant contact," was only another "major
policy"--the sixth, in fact-on their original laundry list.'4 Writing six years before
Brainerd Currie's Married Women's Contracts,"5 Cheatham and Reese insisted that
the law of the place of most significant contact could be found only by including in
one's reasoning a process very like what would later become known as "interest
analysis." Among the factors without which the law of the "state of dominant
interest" could not be ascertained, Cheatham and Reese included "the purposes or
policies underlying the competing laws .... ."I That is, of course, the heart of the
interest-analysis method.
72. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 63RDANNUAL MEETING 54 (1987).
73. For discussions of the relation between the Second Restatement and interest analysis,
see Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Vicissitudes of Choice of Law: The Restatement (First, Second)
and Interest Analysis, 45 BUFF. L. REy. 329 (1997); David E. Seidelson, Interest Analysis or
the Restatement Second of Conflicts: Which is the Preferable Approach to Resolving Choice-
of-Law Problems?, 27 DUQ. L. REV. 73 (1988).
74. Cheatham & Reese, supra note 49, at 972 (discussing list of subject headings that later
became the factors in section 6 of the Second Restatement).
75. Currie, supra note 22 (laying out the rationales for what came to be called
governmental interest analysis).
76. Cheatham & Reese, supra note 49, at 972. The authors went on to illustrate their point
with an analysis of Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949) (Wyzanski, J.), affirmed
sub nom. Parker v. Gordon, 178 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1949). See Cheatham & Reese, supra note
49, at 974.
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VIII. ZEROING IN ON SECTION 6: AN UNFORTUNATE PRONG
Turning, now, to section 6 itself, I have to say that I am not as enamored of every
item on the section 6 laundry list" as section 6's other admirers might be. One of the
first things I would do with it would be to take "the needs of the interstate and
international systems""8 from the top of the list of factors to be taken into account in
choosing law and bump it to the bottom, where I would post it with warnings.79
Mind you, I am prepared to acknowledge as fully as I can that the needs of the
system are very important. I do not know what "the interstate system" is, but I am
willing to assume that the system has something to do with the federal Union, and
with the market, as free a market as a well-regulated country can support. I am
willing to assume that the system has to do with free trade and prosperity. Closer to
Cheatham and Reese, I am willing to assume that the needs of the system have to do
with fairness and convenience for persons crossing state lines. And, further, I am
willing to extend the beneficence of these views over the whole globe, to "the
international system," and eventually, for that matter, "the intergalactic system." No
one could be "against" such great goods and useful arrangements, any more than
anyone could be "against" mothers or the Fourth of July.
But the care and fostering of the "system," whatever it is, is not what courts arefor.
Courts are where you go when the "system" breaks down. Courts are the resort of
individuals who find themselves at the short end of a breach of regular duty. These
are people for whom neither the market nor the political system can furnish a
practical remedy. They come to court, sometimes exhausting their energies and
resources, not to further the needs of the "system" (which is a matter, after all, we
leave to legislatures), but rather, to obtain justice in their particular cases. Courts of
equity were founded in an analogous insight. If the courts of law could not provide
justice, then it became understood that some court must be open to provide it. Today
77. I guess you really want to read through one more printout of section 6 of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws:
§ 6. Choice-of-Law Principles ....
(2)... [The] factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those
states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection ofjustified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 6 (1971).
78. Id. § 6(2)(a). Willis Reese was here influenced by Roger Traynor, Is This Conflict
Really Necessary, 37 TEX. L. REV. 657, 675 (1959). See Reese, supra note 7, at 682 & n.10.
79. I refrain here from urging that this "needs of the system" factor be deleted, as I have
argued elsewhere. See Weinberg, MethodologicalInterventions, supra note 4, at 1362. Butsee
Luther L. McDougal III, Toward the Increased Use ofInterstate and International Policies in
Choice-of-Law Analysis in Tort Cases under the Second Restatement and Leflar's Choice-
Influencing Considerations, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2465 (1996) (for arguments favoring this factor).
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it is fair to say that all courts are courts of equity, in the sense that the taxpayer who
supports them expects them to do justice in her individual case. 0
Judicial tenderness for a "system" strikes me a priori as all wrong. In all the talk
one hears these days about "communitarian" values and "civic republicanism,"'" why
is so little revulsion expressed for such notions? 2 After all, group-think is one of the
things that made twentieth-century communist and fascist countries unfree. Those
wrong systems should make us think twice before subordinating the legal protections
of individuals to the needs of a system. One of the accepted scientific ways of testing
a theory is to take it to a limiting case, an extreme instance, and to see what happens.
At the extreme, in an immoral state or in a state with seriously wrong law, judicial
deferences to the needs of the "system" become obviously wrong. 3 Nazi courts were
characterized by judicial disregard of the requirements of individualized justice, and
heavy judicial emphasis on the needs of the Nazi system. 4 In the antebellum period
in this country courts in the southern slave states concerned themselves with the needs
of the slave system when they denied justice to slaves otherwise legally entitled to
freedom."
In the conflict of laws, concern for the interstate or international systems is
reflected in an impulse toward "comity." Yet such superficially attractive abstractions
can yield accommodations to immoral law even in good societies.8 6 The northern
80. To take a nice recent example of this expectation, see Susan Bandes, Simple Murder:
A Comment on the Legality of Executing the Innocent, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 501,525 (1996) ("To
discuss habeas purely in systemic terms, focusing on federalism implications ... and such
aggregate issues, is to ignore the narrowest, least controversial and most crucial role of the
federal courts-the duty to do justice in the individual case.").
81. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,
30-31 (1985) (stating the aim of reviving republican or communitarian virtues).
82. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, And Is It Worth Reviving,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1715-20 (1989) (explaining that the new civic republicanism may
seem attractive because it tends to be "liberal" civic republicanism, incorporating liberal ideals,
or, rather, libertarian ideals); Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American
Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1987) (using "liberalism," as is
common, to mean classical liberalism, i.e., libertarianism).
83. For discussion of internal judicial struggles in wholly domestic cases in "wicked"
societies, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 101-13 (1986); Weinberg, Methodological
Interventions, supra note 4, at 1321-27 (same; "immoral law" and "unjust societies").
84. See generally Symposium, Nazis in the Courtroom: Lessons from the Conduct of
Lawyers and Judges Under the Laws of the Third Reich and Vichy France, 61 BROOK. L. REV.
1121 (1995); David Luban, A Report on the Legality of Evil: The Case of the Nazi Judges, 61
BROOK. L. REV. 1139, 1145 (1995) (arguing that the Nazi judges were trained to apply law
with the greater good of the state in mind rather than woodenly or positivistically, as had been
supposed). Article 2 of the German Criminal Code of 1935 stated: "Punishment is to be
inflicted on persons who commit an act which has been declared punishable by the Criminal
Code, or which deserves to be punished according to the spirit of a rule of criminal law and
healthy folk-feeling." See also RICHARD LAWRENCE MILLER, NAZI JusTFZ: LAW OF THE
HOLOCAUST (1995).
85. See generally PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND
COMITY (1981); ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1975); Weinberg, Methodological Interventions, supra note 4.
86. For this argument, see generally Weinberg, Methodological Interventions, supra note
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judges that denied justice to slaves filled their opinions with their concern for the
survival of the Union itself as they extended an immoral comity to the law of slave
states. Federal courts in those times, under the delusion that they could save the
Union -by denying justice to kidnapped blacks, enforced the notoriously
unconstitutional Fugitive Slave Acts. 7 Today we look back at those tragic denials of
justice and feel only horror and shame.And if today a court chooses seriously wrong
law-law discriminating, for example, against homosexuals--even in consideration
of the needs of comity and the interstate system-that court will have failed at what
it sits to do. I have already given an example of the mischief such thinking can do in
my discussion of the appalling decision in the Aramco case.8
How, then, given the wrongheadedness of such reasoning, did we get saddled with
section 6's conspicuous recommendation to judges to consider "the needs" of the
"interstate and international" systems? This premier prong, like most of section 6, had
its origin in the 1952 article I have already mentioned, by Elliott Cheatham and Willis
Reese. 9 Cheatham and Reese, too, topped their list with it, arguing that "the smooth
functioning of the interstate and international systems in private law matters should
be the basic consideration in the decision of every choice of law case."' They pointed
out that "[i]n no country are the needs of the interstate system more important than
in the United States where business and social activities almost ignore state lines."
9
'
Cheatham and Reese recognized that a smooth-functioning-of-the-system factor was
somewhat superfluous, often finding vindication in their other "policies." But they
thought that this directive needed an explicit statement on its own because it was
more than the sum ofthe others.9" To illustrate their meaning, they explained that "the
needs of the interstate and international systems normally require that foreigners
should not be the subject of discrimination."93
Cheatham and Reese also believed that rights enforceable in one state generally
should be enforceable in another,' as may be gathered from their citation of the still
much anthologized case of Hughes v. Fetter,9" a then-recent Supreme Court decision
striking down as a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause96 a choice of law that
did not recognize this principle. As another illustration of their meaning, they pointed
to the possibility of an act which, although compelled in one state, would be tortious
4.
87. See id at 1334-36 (describing ways in which northern courts in the early antebellum
period withheld freedom from slaves in transit, asserting reasons of comity and concern for the
needs of interstate travel); id. at 1346-47 (describing ways in which federal courts unjustly
enforced the Fugitive Slave Act out of concern for the survival of the Union-as if rendition
of a slave could save the Union).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
89. See Cheatham & Reese, supra note 49.
90. Id. at 962.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 963 ("It is most unlikely that the lesser policies, when grouped together, form
a complete whole.").
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
96. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 1.
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in another.97 For a final illustration, they pointed to the once much-discussed English
case of Cammell v. Sewell,98 holding valid a sale of lumber which, although
unauthorized, nevertheless gave good title where effected. Of Cammell, Cheatham
and Reese approvingly remarked: "Commercial intercourse among the states of this
country, or among the nations of the world, would be seriously hindered if title to a
chattel, vested under the law of the place where it was at the time, could be
successfully questioned upon its transportation elsewhere."99 In a later article, again
adverting to the needs of the interstate system, Willis Reese pointed out, as another
example, the convenience of choosing the law of the place of incorporation to govern
shareholders' rights. "° Since "stockholders of a single corporation are often scattered
among several states," "it would be inconvenient indeed if [their] rights and liabilities
were not governed by a single law."'' Taken all in all, then, if Cheatham and Reese
had an overriding single idea in mind here, they were thinking of the practical needs
of businesses as transactions move in interstate commerce.
"Exactly," I can hear you agreeing. "Forget about the extreme cases, with their
Nazis and slaves. The finest accommodations in the field have come about when
courts have considered the needs of the interstate system. Think of that grand old
classic case, Milliken v. Pratt."'°2 Chief Judge Gray of Massachusetts was moved to
decide that celebrated case as he did by his understanding of the needs of interstate
commerce. In denying the benefit of forum law to a resident debtor, the Milliken
court gave justice to the nonresident creditor and facilitated interstate commerce at
the same time.
Well, that is the standard perception of Milliken. I am properly wary of saying
anything at all about a classic that has been a subject of discussion for 125 years. But
there is another way of seeing Milliken. Recall that Sarah Pratt, the debtor in Milliken,
was a married woman, who, on the importunings of her husband, had agreed to stand
surety for him. 3 Today we might not be so quick as the Milliken court to impose
liability on an inexperienced debtor whom a third party, with undue influence over
her, has persuaded, without consideration, to guarantee his debts. Consideration in
Milliken, after all, went to Sarah's husband, Daniel, not to Sarah."° Concepts of
marital property do not help to convert this into consideration flowing to the
promisor, when the money Sarah "agreed" to put at risk for Daniel was her separate
property.
Of course Chief Judge Gray was correct, in a general way, that commerce between
Massachusetts and other states would not be helped by putting out-of-state creditors
at their peril to learn the domicile of every debtor, and to study the laws at that
97. See Cheatham & Reese, supra note 49, at 963.
98. 157 Eng. Rep. 1371 (1860) (Ex. Ch.).
99. Cheatham & Reese, supra note 49, at 964.
100. See Reese, supra note 7, at 682-83.
101. Id. at 683.
102. 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
103. See id. at 376.
104. Recall that, in effect, Deering, Milliken & Co. promised Sarah that if she would
promise to stand surety for Daniel, they would extend credit to Daniel for his purchase of
goods from them. See id. at 374-75.
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domicile.'05 But surely the creditor in Milliken, engaged as it was in interstate
commerce, was aware or ought to have been aware that Daniel Pratt's surety was only
his wife, Sarah, in 1873 a married woman under coverture. Indeed, the officers and
agents of Deering, Milliken & Co. had grown to manhood in a world in which
married women nearly always lacked capacity to contract. On Chief Judge Gray's
fine theory about the needs of commerce, Sarah, weak and ignorant, was stripped of
the protections with which her state legislature had shielded her from invasion of her
separate property by her luckless husband-separate property no doubt settled on her
by her family to provide a competency for her whatever the demands of her
husband's creditors. It might have been this disregard of the forum's interest in
Sarah's maintenance that struck Oliver Wendell Holmes, when he characterized
Milliken as going to extremes."° Even Cheatham and Reese might not have gone so
far, even for interstate commerce. Recall that Cheatham and Reese would give a
nonresident plaintiff only what forum law would. 7 No antidiscrimination principle
of interstate commerce expounded by Cheatham and Reese wouldjustify lifting from
an out-of-state creditor's shoulders the burden of a defense to which every in-state
creditor was subject. Their further idea, derived from Cammell v. Sewell, that an
instrument should be held valid if valid where made, did not compel Milliken, either.
No matter what Chief Judge Gray said to persuade you that this was a unilateral
contract made in Maine,'0 8 any lawyer from either state would have told you that the
contract in Milliken, being more naturally understood as a bilateral exchange of
promises, was made in Massachusetts, where Sarah signed and posted her
105. See id.
106. "But the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done. This
principle was carried to an extreme in Milliken v. Pratt." American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (citation omitted). Perhaps Holmes was simply reacting to the
insistence of the Milliken court that the law of the place of making trumps the forum-domicile,
even on the issue of capacity. For an example of Holmes's characteristic willingness to bow
to the positive commands of forum law, see the famous case of Emery v. Burbank, 39 N.E.
1026 (Mass. 1895) (applying Massachusetts law, under which an oral promise to provide by
will was unenforceable). The contract in Emery was arguably a Maine contract. But Holmes
reasoned that, even on that view of the case, Massachusetts, as the place where the estate was
being administered, had a fundamental duty to protect the assets of the testator under
Massachusetts's own laws excluding late-blooming oral claims.
107. See supra text accompanying note 93.
108. Gray's tortured theory was that this was a unilateral contract which kicked in when
Deering, Milliken & Co. began to ship goods on credit to Daniel Pratt. See Milliken, 125 Mass.
at 376. But this conclusion, in turn, and even less elegantly, depended on the terms of the sale
as to shipment and the passing of title.
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acceptance.' 9 And, at the time of making, the contract was invalid at the place of
making because Sarah had no capacity to contract there.
Did justice triumph in Milliken? I do not know. The repeal in Milliken clouds that
issue. We accept what happened to Sarah Pratt, perhaps, in part because the
legislature in Massachusetts itself had interveningly become willing to strip Sarah of
the protections of its laws, and had repealed its married woman's incapacity statute
before the time of decision."0 In the long run, of course, other women if not Sarah
stood to benefit much more from having contractual rights than from having
"protective" legislation. But I am surer about the propriety of the result in Lilienthal
v. Kaufman," ' I the Oregon case that went the other way on analogous facts. Lilienthal
is a familiar object of casebook reproach, since, as everyone knows, Lilienthal flouted
the "needs" of the "interstate system"; but for reasons similar to those I have given
in my discussion of Milliken, I am among the few hardy souls" 2 who think the
Oregon court did the right thing in Lilienthal.
Even if shoring up interstate commerce, or "the interstate system," were a
thoroughly laudable goal, and even if we could advance that goal by sacrificing the
rights of individuals to it, I wonder if that game would be worth the candle. To be
sure, judicial decisions in the aggregate can impact on the commercial or travel
decisions of the public in a counterproductive way. Judges, of course, do take such
general policy considerations into account. But in a case not directly challenging the
interstate commercial power of a state, background concerns about interstate
commerce are at best remote, general, and speculative. Courts sit, precisely, to protect
the rights of individuals, and it would seem to be the antithesis of that duty for courts
to subordinate the rights of individuals to general considerations not constitutionally
or legally controlling their cases.'' 3
But if I am wrong about this, it might be helpful, rather than to delete or demote the
"needs of the interstate and international systems," to think, instead, about a
reformulation that would less hazardously capture Reese's actual concerns:
something along the lines of "the practical needs of businesses as transactions move
109. Id. at 374. From another point of view, Daniel was applying for a charge account.
Milliken essentially said: "We will open an account for you, but you need a co-signer to
guarantee payment. Your wife would be fine, if she can guarantee payment." Looked at in this
way, Sarah and Daniel mail from Massachusetts only a co-signed application for credit-an
offer to deal. But it also may be more natural even on this view to see a bilateral exchange of
promises: Sarah promising to guarantee Daniel's obligations if the company promises to
extend credit.
10. See id. at 383.
111. 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964) (reluctantly holding that forum law would apply to protect an
Oregon debtor's family from his improvident out-of-state contracts, since the family fell within
the scope of the protections of Oregon's "spendthrift" legislation). For my views on Lilienthal,
see Weinberg, On Departing from Forum Law, supra note 22, at 603-05.
112. For other recent writers comfortable with Lilienthal, see Stanley E. Cox, The Interested
Forum, 48 MERCER L. REv. 727, 750 (1997); Shaman, supra note 73, at 352-53. Lilienthal is
one of the subject cases in a roundtable discussion in Choice-of-Law Symposium, Choice of
Law: How it Ought To Be, 48 MERCER L. REv. 623 (1997).
113. See also Weinberg, Methodological Interventions, supra note 4, at 1359-61.
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in interstate or international commerce." In addition, it would not be amiss to insert
an antidiscrimination principle into section 6, counseling courts to avoid the particular
discriminations Reese described in his work under the heading of the "needs of the
interstate and international systems."". It might also be helpful to those who are
reluctant to put this hitherto beloved first "prong" in the shade in any way, to
remember that in any event the prong is to a considerable extent redundant. Courts
are alerted to the interests of other states, the expectations of the parties, and the
convenience of needed uniform rules, elsewhere in the section 6 laundry list.
IX. THE GREAT LOST BEHEST
We have been recalling the Cheatham and Reese article in which a prototype of
section 6 first began to take shape. The authors set this forth as a list of "some of the
majorpolicies underlying choice of law."'t The fascinating thing aboutthe proto-list,
for all its similarity to section 6, is how different it really is from section 6. Here I
want to direct your attention to one particularly significant difference, one that is
closely related to the discussion thus far.
In the two decades the Second Restatement was aboming, one of Cheatham and
Reese's "major policies" seems to have been left by the wayside. In section 6 we find
no trace of Cheatham and Reese's "j]ustice in the individual case."" 6 It is a
mysterious disappearance, and one that has not escaped notice." 7 Yet we do know
that Reese, as Reporter of the Second Restatement, felt strongly about individualized
justice. At least twelve years after undertaking the writing of the Second Restatement,
Reese was still so committed to "justice in the individual case" that he used it to
conclude another proto-section 6 that he published at that time."' Nor was Reese's
view an isolated one. David Cavers, a leading commentator in that day, agreed with
Reese that a choice of law must be evaluated from "the standpoint ofjustice between
the litigating individuals," as well as from "broader considerations of social
policy.",,9
It appears that a torrent of criticism fell upon Reese over this issue ofjustice. In the
minds of his opponents, Reese's was a prescription for "Khadi justice."' 0 Reese
114. Cheatham & Reese, supra note 49, at 962. I return to the possibility of incorporating
an antidiscrimination principle shortly in further discussion of section 6.
115. Ic at 961; see also id. at 961-81 (enumerating and discussing "some of the major
policies" in choice of law). For the full enumeration, see supra note 49.
116. Cheatham and Reese, supra note 49, at 980.
117. See Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some
Observations andan Empirical Note, 56 MD. L. REV. 1232, 1238 (1997) (noting this omission
but not pursuing the point); Harold L. Kom, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 772, 817 (1983) (same).
118. Reese, supra note 7, at 690 ("The court should seek to attain justice in the individual
case.").
119. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS, supra note 17, at 86.
120. Paul H. Neuhaus, Legal Certainty Versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 795, 802 (1963) ("In a democratic and pluralist society, the standards for
judgment cannot be purely personal or irrational; the judge must be guided by generally
recognized standards capable of rational cognition. This is the essential difference between a
democratic legal order and a so-called Khadi justice which decides individual cases in
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readily acknowledged that "[u]sually, it will be difficult to tell where true justice
lies."'' But by far the more serious problem with "justice in the individual case" was
that it was, for most of Reese's critics, the very antithesis of principle.
Justice versus principle. Here was the essential jurisprudential knot. Reese bowed
to his critics on the point, conceding that "justice in the individual case, if it were
given the most significant role, would be totally disruptive of all legal rules."'" But
his accommodation to his critics was only to continue to deny top billing to "justice
in the individual case." The great thing is that Willis Reese was not ready to delete
"justice in the individual case." His stubborn reply to his critics was that,
notwithstanding the conflict between justice and principle, "no judge will willingly
reach a result which he deems to be unjust."'" But, just the same, somewhere
between then and the final draft the heart went out of Reese's fight. He capitulated.
"Justice in the individual case" simply disappeared.
Willis Reese's insight about the justice-seeking impulse is as important and true
today as it was when he was guided by it. Today some of us are rediscovering the
moral thrust of law; some of us are taking up a renewed philosophical commitment
to rights taken seriously, to a Constitution which is interpreted as "justice-seeking."' 4
What did Reese have in mind, when he spoke of "justice in the individual case?"
It appears that Reese was worried about a choice of bad law. In his thinking, it would
be unjust to saddle the parties in conflicts cases with the substandard law' 25 of states
accordance with thejudge's sense of equity and without reliance on any objective standards.").
But see, e.g., Robert A. Leflar, The Nature of Conflicts Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1080, 1088
(1981) ("Recent argument has centered on the propriety of including 'justice in the individual
case'. . . . The argument cannot turn on whether courts in fact have employed this
consideration in deciding conflicts cases; they always have.")
121. Reese, supra note 7, at 690.
122. Id. at 690; see also CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS, supra note 17, at 86
(arguing that to ask ajudge to choose law solely on the basis ofjustice would be to abolish
"our centuries-old subject").
123. Reese, supra note 7, at 690. It was on this ground of the need for "justice in the
individual case" that Professor Leflar, too, justified his equally controversial "choice-
influencing consideration" of "the better law." Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on
Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1584, 1588 (1966).
124. The term "justice-seeking" in constitutional theory is now generally linked with
Professor Sager. Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of
Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 410, 415-16 (1993) (arguing for a "justice-seeking"
interpretation of the Constitution that acknowledges the judge's inevitable sense of political
justice); see also RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: TE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1-38, 72-83 (1996) (taking a moralist view of the Constitution);
SOTInuos A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION OF JUDICIAL POWER (1993) (same); SoTIRIos A.
BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS (1984) (same); James E. Fleming, Securing
Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1995) (same). But see Anthony J. Sebok, The
Insatiable Constitution, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 417, 420 (1997) (arguing that justice-seeking
interpretations inevitably collapse into natural law). For an accommodationist view, see James
Audley McLaughlin, Conflict ofLaws: The New Approach to Choice ofLaw: Justice in Search
of Certainty, Part Two, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 73, 89 (1991) ("It is not absurd to suggest that
rights analysis can be combined with policy analysis no matter how vehemently each camp
might protest.").
125. The term "substandard law" is, I believe, Professor Juenger's. For his most recent
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with minority positions "out of tune with the times."' 6 For this reason Reese
bestowed his reluctant blessing, if not his praise, on the New York Court of Appeals's
resort to a choice-of-law rule "of dubious merit"'27 in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc.,' to permit full recovery to a New York widow in a wrongful death suit. (The
law of the other state in Kilberg provided a cap on actual damages in wrongful death
cases.) Of course Willis Reese was not the first or last author to voice concern over
substandard law.'29 Paul Freund had famously suggested that law diverging from the
discussion, see Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice of Law: How It Ought Not To Be, 48 MERCER L.
REV. 757, 762 (1997) (referring to "substandard foreign rules that [offend the forum's] sense
ofjustice") [hereinafter Juenger, Choice of Law]. His first usage of the term in the Westlaw
database is in Friedrich K. Juenger, What Now?, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 509, 515 (1985).
126. Reese, supra note 7, at 690.
127. Id.
128. 172 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1961). The reader will recall that the Kilberg court chose its own
law on damages, on the spurious ground that damages were "procedural," and on the
recognition that New York's policy favored unlimited recovery. The Kilberg court relied on
this last as "public policy"; that is, as furnishing a barrier to otherwise applicable law. But
"public policy," of course, under New York's own illustrious case law, could not effectuate
a simple policy preference. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918)
(Cardozo, J.) (reserving the limitation of "public policy" for foreign law that offends "some
deep-rooted tradition of the common weal").
129. See Paul Freund, ChiefJustice Stone and the Conflict ofLaws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210,
1216 (1946) (suggesting that law which the main stream of cases has passed by might be
disregarded); Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 298-99 (1966) (arguing that obsolescent law can be "a drag on the coat-
tails of civilization"); Cheatham & Reese, supra note 49, at 980 (describing "a situation in
which one of the possibly applicable laws is in tune with the times and the other is thought to
drag on the coat tails of civilization"). Professors von Mehren and Trautman suggested that
forum law that is "regressing," rather than "emerging," be avoided. ARTHUR TAYLOR VON
MEHREN & DONALD THEODORE TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 377 (1965).
Professor Weintraub early suggested a similar disregard of forum law that is "aberrational" or
"anachronistic." RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAwS 346 (2d
ed. 1980); see also RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARYONTHE CONFLICTOF LAws 359-60
(3d ed. 1986). Among current commentators, see, for example, Larry Kramer, Rethinking
Choice ofLaw, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 334-36 (1990) (arguing that the forum should reject
"obsolete" nonforum law), and Juenger, Choice ofLaw, supra note 125 (discussing howjudges
use concepts such as "policy" or "interests" to avoid applying substandard laws). See, e.g.,
Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1978) (ruling for the defendant
under Louisiana law; pointing out that the plaintiffs claim was "attenuated and
anachronistic"); Yazell v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 351-53 (1966) (describing the doctrine of
coverture as "peculiar and obsolete" and expressing "distaste" for it); see also Clark v. Clark,
222 A.2d 205, 209 (N.H. 1966).
For further arguments identifying typical substandard laws as defenses, and, given forum
shopping, characterizing substandard law as typically nonforum law, see Weinberg, Against
Comity, supra note 26, at 65-66.
Because defenses subordinate ... fundamental policy concerns underlying a
whole field of law, they tend to be disfavored both as a matter of substantive law
and of conflicts law. Moreover, defenses, because of their arbitrariness,
disparateness, and specificity, are vulnerable to equal protection and due process
attacks. [Thus] it is hard to argue that foreign law is not systematically different
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main stream of cases might with advantage be passed by.3 °
What was Reese's concern over inferior law, but a preference for "better law"?
Robert Leflar, the exponent of "better law,"'' made the association between better
law and justice even more explicit. 3"2 Both authors were saying only that a good rule
is a rule that furthers rather than impedes the interests ofjustice. What was confusing
about Reese's own understanding, representative of a common mistake in his
generation, I think, was his assumption that new law would be "better" than old. He
thought newer law would tend to be more progressive, and thus more just. This easy
equating of "new" and "progressive" seems to me less helpful in our own day. I think
Reese was implicitly assuming that new law would tend to be more remedial. I draw
this inference in some measure from the extrinsic evidence of section 6(2)(e), in
which Reese urges the forum to consider the policies underlying the field of law.
Such foundational policies are always remedial (being compensatory, deterrent,
validating, and so forth), unlike the policies underlying particular defenses. At
bottom, all states seek to remedy injuries and enforce legal norms. And so Reese,
with Cheatham, stressed that it was important that a court choosing law strive to find
the most fundamental policies underlying law.'33 We ought to understand this to be
an emphasis upon remedial as opposed to defensive or prudential policy. But today
it seems even less plausible than it was when Reese was writing that law becomes
increasingly remedial. We have passed through one too many waves of tort reform
to have any such confidence. 3 4 The most we can say is that all states continue to
share underlying legal norms, whatever the reasonable limitations that local
litigational "reforms" place on underlying policy. 3 ' One might suppose it fairer to say
from, and less regulatory than, forum law.... [Forum] law is indeed generally
"better."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
130. See Freund, supra note 129, at 1216.
131. Recent critiques of the "better law" principle include, for example, Joel P. Trachtman,
Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government Responsibility, 26 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 975, 1014 n. 159 (1994) (arguing that discretion qualified only by the adjective
"better" would be government not by laws but by Khadis). For the more extreme view that
"better" law violates not only the Full Faith and Credit Clause but the principle of Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, see Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial
States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 312-13
(1992). But see Weinberg, Methodological Interventions, supra note 4, at 1367-69 (pointing
out that the interested forum always has constitutional power to adopt any rule as its own, and
that courts typically do fashion new rules for themselves in part from influential rules
developed in other jurisdictions).
132. See ROBERT A. LEPLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 107 (3d ed. 1977). i would
prefer, however, that a revised section 6 be explicit about the desirability of "better law," in
addition to the desirability of "justice in the individual case." I think these are two separable
notions, even if thinking about them tends to lead to the same conclusion.
133. See Cheatham & Reese, supra note 49, at 978.
134. For a more extended discussion of the problem, see Weinberg, Federal Common Law,
supra note 18, at 824-26.
135. See the famous language from The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (C.C.D. Md. 1865)
(No. 12,578) (Chase, J.): "[Certainly] it better becomes the humane and liberal character of
proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy, when not required to withhold
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that widely shared policies are reflected in "better law," while defensive and
prudential policies tend to be more local, isolated, and aberrational. This retains a
grain of truth, but the popularity of particular tort reforms weakens the force of the
observation.'36
Reese was right, in any event, that as a practical matter, in a given case it is going
to be very hardto see wherejustice lies.'1 Reese's more troublesome concession, that
justice-seeking could undermine all principle,' also contains more than a grain of
truth. What Reese meant was that, although judges would maintain the appearance
of applying received formalisms, they would, in fact, strive for a just result, even if
this put pressure on their formalisms. The only problem I have with this
understanding is Reese's blaming only justice-seeking for judicial manipulation of
rules. In Milliken v. Pratt, recall, Chief Judge Gray was seeking to further the needs
of the interstate system, rather than the interests ofjustice; it was in the interest ofthe
interstate system, not of justice, that Gray manipulated the rules of contract law to
transmute the contract in that case from a very ordinary bilateral exchange of
promises clinched in Massachusetts into a surprisingly unilateral contract transported
to Maine. There is Khadi injustice as well as Khadi justice.
I cannot help following Reese to his conclusion. Even if we can never discern
where justice lies, and even if courts may have to struggle with their formalisms to
achieve it, the search for justice seems fundamental to choosing law, as it must be to
all adjudication. I would restore this great lost behest to section 6, and put it at the
head of all the rest.
X. ADOPTING ADOPTION
There is another key addition I would make to section 6. I would add a policy that
has not yet been suggested but that might make a constructive contribution to the way
interstate cases are administered. The new policy would encourage the forum to
"adopt" identified better law, rather than to "choose" it.
Recently I have discussed the difference between these two techniques, the method
of choosing, and the method of adopting, law. 39 I believe that that discussion helps
to reconcile my positions with the view of Professor Juenger, with whom I tend to
agree, that the forum should choose the best law available. 4 ' In essence, I am
it by established and inflexible rules."
136. For a more extended discussion of this problem, see Weinberg, Federal Common Law,
supra note 18, at 824-26.
137. See Reese, supra note 7, at 690.
138. See id. at 690 ("disruptive of all legal rules").
139. See Weinberg, Methodological Interventions, supra note 4, at 1367-69 (explaining the
differences between "choosing" and "adopting" nonforum law); Weinberg, On Departingfrom
Forum Law, supra note 22, at 610-17.
140. FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 195-97, 213
(1993); see Joachim Zekoll, Choice of Law and Multistate Justice, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1099
(1995) (reviewing JUENGER, supra). For discussion of Professor Juenger's views, see Stanley
E. Cox, Back to Conflicts Basics: Choice ofLaw and Multistate Justice, 44 CATH. U. L. REV.
525 (1995) (also reviewing JUENGER, supra); Russell J. Weintraub, ChoosingLaw with an Eye
on the Prize, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 705 (1994) (same); Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of
Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and
2000]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
reasoning from the old Legal Realist insight that the forum always applies its own
law, whatever it says it is doing. I am arguing that, given this reality, when the forum
is considering a departure from its own law, the better method, where it is available,
is for the forum to adopt the chosen law as its own rule of decision for this and all
subsequent similar cases at the forum.' 4 ' Although critics have charged 142 that
choosing the best rule available would violate the requirements of positivism laid
down in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,143 that criticism becomes irrelevant once the
forum adopts the better rule as its own. The forum always has full constitutional
power in a case before it to make law for all issues in which it has legitimate
governmental interests.'" Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, an interested forum
cannot depart from its own law without dysfunction.'45
Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79 (1993); Luther L. McDougal III, The Real Legacy offBabcock v.
Jackson: Lex Fori Instead of Lex Loci Delicti and Now It's Time for a Real Choice-of-Law
Revolution, 56 ALB. L. REV. 795 (1993). For related analyses, see William L. Reynolds, Legal
Process and Choice of Law, 56 MD. L. REV. 1371 (1997); Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal
Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 949 (1994). For my discussion of
Professor Juenger's views, see Weinberg, Methodological Interventions, supra note 4, at 1368-
69.
141. See, e.g., Pevoski v. Pevoski, 358 N.E.2d 416 (Mass. 1976) (reasoning that forum law
should apply to a case between residents; adopting the "better" New York rule denying
interspousal tort immunity); see also Weinberg, On Departing from Forum Law, supra note
22, at 601 (arguing that "a court that has found the law of a sister state to be 'better' than its
own, in so doing has inescapably discerned its own current policy. Once that happens, the
cleaner, more direct approach would be to make a change in local law.").
142. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 13 1, at 312 (arguing that the forum cannot choose better
law rather than the law otherwise applicable without creating the sort of general common law
that Erie struck down). But see Weinberg, Methodological Interventions, supra note 4, at
1367-69 (arguing that the interested forum always has constitutional power to adopt any rule
as its own; pointing out that courts typically do fashion new rules for themselves in part from
influential rules developed in otherjurisdictions). See also JUENGER, supra note 140, at 165-69
(unfortunately suggesting a need to overrule Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S 64 (1938),
and restore Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), to permit federal courts to develop a
separate body of substantive law for two-state cases).
I believe that neither Kramer, Larry Kramer, Appendix D: Letterfrom Larry Kramer to
Harry C. Sigman, Esq., August 29, 1994, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. .475 (1995), nor
Borchers, supra note 140, should be read as having such concerns. The same probably holds
true for Cox, supra note 140, at 533 ("This does not mean, however, that the forum should
seek law outside of its own sphere of influence or should try to apply law to situations outside
of its proper sphere of influence.").
143.304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that the Constitution requires rules of decision attributable
to some sovereign that can be identified). For recent skeptical discussion, see Jack Goldsmith
& Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673 (1998).
144. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (employing ihe test
announced in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981)) ("[The] State must have
a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."); see also Pacific Employers
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) (holding that the law of either
interested state can constitutionally apply in a case of true conflict).
145. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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Adopting a foreign rule as the forum's own brings with it substantial benefits. Not
the least of these must be the improved protection it obviously offers against the
appearance of "Khadijustice." A court that is prepared to apply a new rule in all like
cases is surely less likely to have made a lawless or willful application in the case
before it.
To this advantage must be added the greater honesty and directness of the
approach. The forum would not, after all, have reached for foreign law that
inadequately reflected its own policies. Moreover, in embracing a rule identified as
better, the forum can avoid the difficulty of having to undermine its own rule and
then having to enforce the undermined rule in a later case. Then, too, adopting rather
than applying a foreign rule helps to ensure the evenhandedness ofthe forum's justice
in like domestic cases. Finally, the local legislature would thereby gain power to
override the announced rule on its merits.
XI. AN ANTIDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE
For some time now, diehard anti-modernists have been criticizing modem methods
of choice of law as discriminatory.146 While I believe the anti-modernists are wrong
about this, I think we should take from them a reminder of the importance of the
antidiscrimination principle in the administration of law in courts.
Recently my colleague, Doug Laycock, 47 has taken up the argument. Professor
Laycock decries what he perceives as the core evil of modem methods:
discriminatory denials of forum law to "visitors from sister states.' 4 On this account
he urges the abandonment of forum preference in favor of territorial rules.4 9 The
appeal of such reasoning is suggested by the fact that although Laycock's article is
well-cited, it has received little critical attention.' Laycock acknowledges that when
the forum departs from its own law there is discrimination between similarly situated
146. For responses to this class of argument, see, for example, Dodge, supra note 34; Gene
R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the Forgiving Constitution, 71 IND. L.J. 271, 291-94 (1996);
Jeffrey Brand-Ballard, Legitimacy, Consequentialism, and Conflict ofLaws: Lea Brilmayer's
Rights-Based Theory, 30NEWENG. L. REv. 39 (1995); Bruce Posnak, InterestAnalysis: They
StillDon 't Get It, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1121, 1151 (1994) [hereinafter Posnak, They Still Don't
Get It]; Herma Hill Kay, A Defense of Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis, 215 RECUEIL
DES COURS 9 (1989); Bruce Posnak, Interest Analysis and Its "New Crits", 36 AM. J. COMP.
L. 681 (1988); Weinberg, Place of Trial, supra note 20, at 87-90; Russell J. Weintraub,
Interest Analysis in the Conflict of Laws as an Application of Sound Legal Reasoning, 35
MERCER L. REv. 629, 630-34 (1983-84); Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum
Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the 'New Critics, 34 MERCER L. REv. 593
(1983).
147. See Laycock, supra note 131, at 276-78; see also Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts,
and the Fate ofthe "Inside-Outsider", 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1986); John Hart Ely, Choice
of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 173 (1981);
P. John Kozyris, Reflections on Allstate-The Lessening ofDue Process in Choice ofLaw, 14
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 889 (1981); James Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78
MICH. L. REv. 872 (1980).
148. Laycock, supra note 131, at 276.
149. "Eliminating forum preference altogether is the only constitutional solution." Id. at 3 11.
150. One exception is Posnak, They Still Don't Get It, supra note 146, at 1151-70.
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residents in like cases; but he is more disturbed by the discrimination he perceives
when a court would apply its local law to benefit its own resident, but would not do
so to benefit a nonresident.' Professor Laycock underscores the point by reminding
us that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV' prohibits
"discrimination" against "visitors,"' while it does not prohibit discrimination
between forum residents.5 4 But of course the Equal Protection Clause does.
I suspect Professor Laycock is struggling here with a straw man.'55 It is very rare
in my experience to see a case in which courts discriminate against visitors. For
obvious reasons, modem choice-of-law methods tend to treat all persons acting or
injured at the forum identically. Those persons understand very well that they have
come within the sphere of the forum's governmental concerns. The key to Professor
Laycock's conundrum is that the Constitution protects against discrimination among
those who are similarly situated only. When persons come within the forum's sphere
of governmental interest, of course forum law must govern them, whether they are
residents or not. Thus, to find an example of the alleged problem, Laycock has to rely
upon the notoriously wrong case of Schultz v. Boy Scouts ofAmerica, Inc.,'56 a case
he is certainly right to deplore. Although the safety of a territory is ultimately secured
for the benefit of those living there, that policy cannot rationally be effectuated
without extending its benefit to everybody present there. Potholes of unsafety hurt
visitors and residents alike. 7
Professor Laycock gives another example of forum discrimination against
nonresidents: the case in which the nonresident is not at the forum when injured or
acting. In Professor Laycock's example, the plaintiff is the nonresident and the
defendant is the resident. (We recognize this case, of course, as one configuration of
the classic unprovided-for case.) In such cases Professor Laycock believes that the
interest-analytic forum would withhold its law from the nonresident.'
For some reason Professor Laypock seems not to have noticed that if the forum
does withhold its law from the nonresident in such a case, it is because the forum is
151. See Laycock, supra note 131, at 278, 311.
152. U.S. CONST. art. IV.
153. Actually, in the case of corporate parties, the Commerce Clause would better have
served the argument. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177-78 (1869) (holding that
corporations are not "citizens" for purposes ofthe Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV).
154. See Laycock, supra note 131, at 278.
155. For an argument that such views are without foundation, see Weinberg, On Departing
from Forum Law, supra note 22, at 596-97 (concluding that forum discrimination is a
"bugbear" that "need never have engaged the intellect").
156. 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985) (holding erroneously that New York lacked an interest in
remedying a tort to a visiting tourist, a minor), cited in Laycock, supra note 131, at 329 n.449.
Cf Weinberg, Against Comity, supra note 26, at 89 (pointing out the irrationality of New
York's declaring "open season on visiting Boy Scouts" in the midst of New York's "I love
New York" campaign to promote tourism).
157. The position is explained in Weinberg, Place of Trial, supra note 20, at 79. The current
attraction of courts to spurious distinctions between conduct-regulating rules and other rules
has distracted them from the straightforward analysis which might have preserved the Schultz -
court from embarrassment.
158. See Laycock, supra note 131, at 276 n.158.
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applying the law of the place of injury,5 9 the very thing he says he wants it to do.160
But set that to one side. Professor Laycock rightly presents this example as a
hypothetical case, because in this situation American courts not infrequently do
extend their protections to nonresidents, even as against their own residents, even
when their regulatory policies cannot easily be engaged.' 6' It is common experience
that courts tend to (and should, where feasible) choose law that will allow the plaintiff
to go to the jury.162
159. This was the preferred solution, for example, in the much-criticized case of Neumeier
v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972), which denied an otherwise meritorious claim under the
irrelevant law of the place of injury.
160. I identify this and other inconsistencies of the typical anti-modernist critique in
Weinberg, Place of Trial, supra note 20, at 88.
They [anti-modernists] demand the benefit of forum law for all, while insisting
that it is parochial if the forum in fact applies forum law. They demand the
benefit of forum law for all, while deploring forum shopping. They demand the
benefit of forum law for all, while insisting that only the law of the place of injury
(or other "neutral," event-based, territorially chosen law) be applied. They
demand the benefit of forum law for all while deploring the "export" of
burdensome forum law to nonresidents acting abroad---even though the forum
may be the place of injury in such cases. These positions, taken together, are so
entertaining one almost hopes the anti-modernists will go on insisting on them.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
161. See, e.g., Bushkin Assocs., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 473 N.E.2d 662 (Mass. 1985)
(approving an action for a finder's fee by a New York broker against a Massachusetts
customer, where the place of contracting was New York; New York, but not Massachusetts,
would have barred suit on an oral contract). For a case in which a resident and a nonresident
were both injured out of state in the same car, see the concern expressed in Tooker v. Lopez,
249 N.E.2d 394, 408 (N.Y. 1969) (Burke, J., concurring). The difficulty came to a head in New
York in Neumeier, in which the court, announcing a set of choice rules for future such tort
cases, treated the place of injury as tie breaker. My analysis of Neumeier can be found tucked
away in Weinberg, Mass Torts, supra note 11, at 841-44.
The Neumeier court's (and Professor Laycock's) territorial tie-breaker does have the merit
that, in the case in which the underlying event occurred where the defendant resides, the forum
has an easier time enlisting that state's regulatory policies. The classic casebook example is
probably Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1973) (applying plaintiff-favoring forum
law against the resident defendant driver, when the place of injury, which would have barred
suit, was the plaintiff's residence). For a case in which the forum's regulatory policies worked
against its resident plaintiff, see Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 248 N.E.2d
576, 582 (N.Y. 1969). In an action on an oral agreement by a New York broker claiming a
finder's fee, the court held for the New Jersey defendant customer. The court reasoned that
New York law, unlike New Jersey law, requires a brokerage agreement to be in writing, and
that New York has an interest in applying this rule to protect "foreign principals who utilize
New York brokers," in order to give foreign principals confidence in dealing with New York
agents). See also Bushkin Assocs., 473 N.E.2d at 664-65, for a version of Daystrom in which
the New York broker went to Massachusetts to sue his customer at her home. The
Massachusetts court allowed the plaintiff broker to go to the jury under forum law. Id. at 671.
162. The extended argument for this proposition is in Weinberg, Mass Torts, supra note 11,
at 819-23 (arguing that plaintiff-favoring choices of law are the only "neutral" choices:
"[W]hen the law chosen on an issue of liability is favorable to a plaintiff, a likely result is only
that she will be allowed to try to prove her case, and that the defendant will have a chance to
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But if the forum does withhold its law in an unprovided-for case, nothing in that
can violate the Constitution. To the contrary, a court applying its own law when it has
no interest in doing so in any other case would be violating the Due Process Clause; 63
we tolerate arbitrary forum law in the unprovided-for case only because the other
state's law is equally arbitrary. Nor is any antidiscrimination principle offended when
a nonresident with a foreign cause of action seeks favorable forum law and does not
get it. If Professor Laycock were right, forum non conveniens where the defendant
resides would be unconstitutional. (Perhaps it should be, but that is another matter. 64)
Although the anti-modernists' allegations of discrimination are easily answered,
there is every reason a revised section 6 should articulate an explicit
antidiscrimination policy. This is not merely to lend comfort to the anti-modernists.
They rightly remind us that the antidiscrimination principle is too fundamental and
too important to have been omitted from section 6. Repairing this omission should
help to alert courts to those concededly rare situations in which a risk of
discrimination might be presented.
The principle is so important in itselfthat its omission seems perplexing. My hunch
is that an explicit antidiscrimination principle became a practical impossibility when
section 6 was drafted. That is because "the law of the place of most significant
contact" had meanwhile become the overarching choice of the Second Restatement.
Nothing could be more discriminatory than departures from the law of the forum in
cases within its scope, properly construed. 65
XII. ENvoI
In the end, the past generation's retrograde retreat into jurisdiction-selecting
techniques and presumptive territorial rules can be seen for what it was. It was a fear
of cutting loose from moorings in the past, a fear of flying. But we can build upon
that generation's intellectual achievements in interest analysis, including the early
interest analysts' understanding of the ordinary presumption in favor of forum law.
Of course, an interest analysis will produce unjust results if there is seriously wrong
law either at the interested forum or at the only interested state.'" Professor Reynolds
be heard. On the other hand, when the law chosen on an issue of liability is favorable to a
defendant, a likely result is dismissal, with prejudice."). Elsewhere on several occasions I have
made the extended argument that the American litigational system is structured in a plaintiff-
favoring way. See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Choice ofLaw and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L.
REv. 440,463-68 (1982). For detailed critical discussion of these views, see George D. Brown,
The Ideologies ofForum Shopping-Why Doesn't a Conservative Court Protect Defendants?;.
71 N.C. L. REv. 649 (1993).
163. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (striking down forum law
in a class action adjudicating nonresidents' rights to out-of-state natural gas interests); Home
Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (striking down forum law in an action between parties
nonresident at all relevant times, in a case on out-of-state facts).
164. For the view that forum non conveniens is irrational at the defendant's home state, see
Louise Weinberg, Insights and Ironies: The American Bhopal Cases, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 307,
308-15 (1985).
165. See, for example, the discussion of the Aramco case, supra text accompanying notes
24-27.
166. For a general consideration of this class of problems, see Weinberg, Methodological
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argues, "Weinberg's lexfori rule would... increase the number of perverse results
that happen any time decisionmaking is separated from policy." 67 Of course, the law
of "the place of most signficant contact," or any other place away from the forum, if
chosen without regard to policy, is equally perverse. As for the perverse law of the
interested forum, the obvious solution for the forum applying identified "better"
foreign law is to adopt it as its own, rather than to purport to "choose" it. 68 In the
case in which the technique of adoption ofbetter law is unrealistic or unavailable, the
presumption of forum law can and should be overcome in the interests ofjustice 69
Indeed, this ancient rule of the common law is a longstanding "true rule" in the
conflict of laws. 70 It explains a good share of the naive departures from forum law
familiarly anthologized in the casebooks.
17 1
We have been designing here a third conflicts restatement that owes much to the
SecondRestatement. But our new third restatement owes as much to the newer model
the SecondRestatement's reporterhimself supplied in 1988.11 cannot say that Willis
Reese would have favored extending his 1988 model to the Restatement as a whole,
but the arguments for doing so are convincing. Our third restatement would strip the
Second Restatement of its volumes of particularized rules and definitions, and would
give courts direct and immediate access to its improved version of section 6. The
salient features of our third restatement would be trans-substantive and therefore
few.' They would include presumptions:
171
-That ordinarily a court will apply its own laws and policies, properly
construed, to an issue falling within their scope;
-That in comparing the interests of the forum and of other concerned states,
if it becomes apparent that there is only one interested state, a court will
presumptively apply the law of that state; and
Interventions, supra note 4.
167. Reynolds, supra note 140, at 1393. To similar effect, see also Patrick J. Borchers, Back
to the Past: Anti-Pragmatism in American Conflicts Law, 48 MERCERL. REV. 721,726 (1997).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 139-45.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 115-38.
170. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Choice of Law, Current Doctrine and "True Rules", 49 CAL.
L. REV. 240,241 (1961) (empirically identifying "true rules" of choice of law that are reliably
predictive of actual outcomes in a way formal rules might not be).
171. See, e.g., Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 95 N.W.2d 814 (Wis. 1959) (choosing
the law of the state of domicile to govern the issue of interspousal tort immunity where
nonforum law would not permit the plaintiff to go forward); Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99
(N.Y. 1954) (choosing English law to govern a separate support agreement where forum law
would leave the forum family without maintenance).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72; SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 142
(as amended 1988).
173. Where more particularized directives may prove to be indispensable, they can be
subsumed under a general reference to exceptions, which in turn can be illustrated in the
commentary accompanying the black letter.
174. Other primary directives would deal with such matters as, for example, the effect of a
choice-of-law clause.
175. In these proposals I use descriptive, rather than drafting, language.
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-That a court will determine whether the foregoing presumptions can be
overcome in accordance with the choice-of-law "policies" listed in (an
improved version of) section 6.
The proposed revision would not only give courts faced with a choice of law
immediate access to the functional desiderata in section 6, and would not only obviate
any intervening need for characterization of issues, and lists of "contacts"; but also
would preserve courts from struggles to "solve" false conflicts, and from the danger
of "solving" them irrationally.
As for the redesign of section 6 itself, the proposal would continue to include
prominent references to the essential tools of interest analysis:
-The interests of the forum and
-The interests of other concerned states.
But a redesigned section 6 would de-emphasize systemic "needs." Instead, it would
restore Willis Reese's focus on:
-Justice in the individual case; and
-Better law.
Finally, an upgraded section 6 would embrace two new policies:
-An antidiscrimination principle, and
-A principle favoring adoption rather than "choice" of nonforum law
identified as "better law."
One obstacle to any such reform, I am afraid, is the nature of restatements
themselves. A restatement, as we all know, has to be a compendium of particularized
rules accompanied by voluminous notes. Without this, what would members of the
American Law Institute debate at annual meetings? Yet each of the section 6
"policies," after all, could still ground its own voluminous notes, if that is any
comfort. Is it necessarily a vain hope that the Institute could, just once, find the
courage for a pamphlet instead of a set of telephone books-could, just once, find the
courage of brevity?
Streamlined, reconceptualized, and refocused along the lines suggested here, a
redesigned restatement can recall courts now distracted by mind-numbing contact-
counting and iteration of black letter to their essential tasks: affording reason in the
application of law, and justice in the individual case. Reason and justice, after all, are
what courts are all about. In this special sense, principle and justice converge.
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